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Abstract
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a
continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973),
Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a).
The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded
as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization
of large games.
In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that,
in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of
them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations
of large games.
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1 Introduction
Nash’s (1950) celebrated existence theorem asserts that every finite normal-form game
has a mixed strategy equilibrium. However, in many contexts mixed strategies are
unappealing and hard to interpret, leading naturally to the question of the existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Schmeidler (1973) was successful in obtaining an answer to the above question.
He showed that in a special class of games — in which each player’s payoff depends
only on his choice and on the average choice of the others — a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists in every such game with a continuum of players.
Schmeidler’s formalization parallels that of Nash in that players have a finite
action space, there is a function assigning to each of them a payoff function in a
measurable way and the equilibrium notion is formalized in terms of a strategy, i.e.,
as a measurable function from players into actions. The difference is that, while
in Nash (1950) there is a finite number of players (which, in particular, makes the
measurability conditions trivial), in Schmeidler (1973) the set of players is the unit
interval endowed with the Lebesgue measure.
Although natural, Schmeidler’s formalization entails serious difficulties. As shown
by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), Schmeidler’s theorem does not extend to general
games — in fact, one has to assume that either the action space or the family of
payoff functions is denumerable in order to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium (see Khan and Sun (1995b) and Carmona (2008)).
Motivated by this, several alternative formalizations have been proposed in order
to obtain an existence result for the case of a general, not necessarily countable,
action space. These include those of Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a),
which consider a richer measure space of players, that of Mas-Colell (1984), where the
equilibrium notion is formalized as a distribution, and that of Rashid (1983), which
considers approximate equilibria in games with a large but finite set of players.1
1See also Khan and Sun (1999), Kalai (2004) and Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) among
others.
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Clearly, an existence theorem that allows for general compact action spaces also
allows for finite such spaces. Furthermore, the existence of an equilibrium strategy
also implies the existence of an equilibrium distribution, such distribution being ob-
tained as the inverse image of the equilibrium strategy together with the function
assigning payoff functions to players. Therefore, one might be tempted to use the
success of a particular formalization to address the existence problem to argue for
it as a more appropriate approach to the modeling of large games. We argue that
such an appraisal of the different formalizations is misleading by establishing the
equivalence between the existence results they yield.
Indeed, our results roughly show that: (1) the existence of approximate equilibria
in large games is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium distribution in games
with a continuum of players; (2) the existence of an equilibrium distribution in games
with a continuum of players is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium strategy in
games with a super-atomless space of players; and (3) the existence of an equilibrium
strategy in games with a super-atomless space of players is equivalent to the existence
of an equilibrium strategy in games with a Lebesgue space of players and a finite action
space.
The first equivalence result is important because it confirms the fact that games
with a continuum of players are an idealization of games with a large but finite set of
players.2 In fact, as its proof makes clear, equilibria in one class can be constructed
using equilibria of the other. The second equivalence result shows formally that, for
the solution to the existence problem in games with a super-atomless space of players
(which includes those with a Loeb space of players), it makes no difference whether
the equilibrium notion is formalized as a strategy or as a distribution. In fact, in such
games, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if an equilibrium distribution exists. Fi-
nally, the third equivalence result shows that super-atomless spaces of players provide
a rich enough space to solve the (measurability) difficulties that one encounters when
working with simpler spaces of players such as Lebesgue spaces.
2See Carmona (2004a) for a characterization of Nash equilibria of games with continuum of
players in terms of approximate equilibria of games with a large but finite set of players.
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More broadly, our equivalence results indicate that the assumptions and conclu-
sions present in the several existence theorems for large games compensate each other.
Thus, although some of these theorems allow higher levels of generality along some
dimensions, this extra generality is exactly compensated by the strengthening of some
other condition or the weakening of some other conclusion, rendering all of them as
equivalent.
Furthermore, our results provide a non-trivial and unified approach to the exis-
tence problem of large games. In fact, they are designed to meet the following two
criteria. First, the conditions that we show to be equivalent are stated in such a way
that they can be falsified. This goal is obtained by requiring the action space to be
merely a separable metric space, rather than compact. Second, by particularizing
the action space to be compact, we obtain as a corollary to our results the classical
existence theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1995b)
and Khan and Sun (1999).
We note that an equivalence result similar to ours has been obtained by Balder
(2002). There, he shows that the existence of equilibrium in pure strategy is equivalent
to the existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies (and, like us, uses this result to
obtain several known existence results). Our results are different because: (a) the
conditions that we show to be equivalence are different than those considered by
Balder (2002), (b) his equivalence is between two true propositions, while in ours, the
propositions can be true or false, (c) his framework is more general than ours but (d)
our arguments are (somewhat) elementary. In contrast with Balder’s work, our goal
is not to obtain a general existence theorem that can generalize or at least encompass
most of such results, but rather to show that several standard formalizations of large
games yield equivalent existence results.
The equivalence between the formalizations we consider to yield an existence result
is likely to hold more generally. In particular, recent results by Al-Najjar (2007) show
that this conclusion can be extended to discrete large games, i.e., games with a
countable set of players endowed with a finitely additive distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our notation and
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basic definitions. In Section 3, we present our equivalence results. The proof of our
main results are presented in Section 4. These proofs rely on three lemmas (stated and
proved also in Section 4) that have some interest in their own right. The first provides
a characterization of equilibrium distributions in terms of approximate equilibria of
games with a large, but finite number of players. The second provides sufficient
conditions for the existence of finite-valued approximate equilibria in games with a
continuum of players. Finally, the third presents a representation result which implies
that, in games with a super-atomless space of players, every equilibrium distribution is
the inverse image of a Nash equilibrium and the function describing the game. Section
5 provides some concluding remarks. Some auxiliary results are in the Appendix.
2 Notation and Definitions
In the class of normal-form games we consider, all players have a common pure
strategy space and each player’s payoff depends on his choice and on the distribution
of actions induced by the choices of all players. Let X denote the common action
space; we assume that X is a separable metric space and let d denote the metric
on X. A distribution of actions is simply a Borel probability measure on X. We let
M(X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on X endowed with the Prohorov
metric ρ, and let C denote the space of all bounded, continuous, real-valued functions
on X ×M(X) endowed with the sup norm.3 Thus, each player’s payoff function is
an element of C.
The space of players is described by a probability space (T, Σ, ϕ). A game is then
specified by the vector of payoff functions, one for each player. To each player t, we
associate, in a measurable way, a bounded, continuous function V (t) : X×M(X) → R
with the following interpretation: V (t)(x, π) is player t’s payoff when he plays action
x and faces the distribution π. Thus, we have defined a function V : T → C and we
assume that V is measurable and that it induces a tight probability measure on C.
Formally, letting T (C) denote the set of all tight Borel probability measures on C, we
3Recall that the Prohorov metric metricizes the weak topology of M(X).
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require that ϕ ◦ V −1 ∈ T (C). In such a game, a strategy is a measurable function
f : T → X. Then, for any strategy f , player t’s payoff function is obtained from V
in the following way:
U(t)(f) = V (t)(f(t), ϕ ◦ f−1). (1)
We denote such a game by G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X).
The following particular cases for the space of players play a special role in our
results. Our asymptotic results concern games with a large, but finite set of players.
In that case, we denote the space of players by (Tn, Σn, νn), where n is the number
of players, Tn = {1, . . . , n}, Σn equals the family of all subsets of Tn and νn is the
uniform measure on Tn, i.e., νn({t}) = 1/n for all t ∈ Tn. A game with a finite number
of players is then represented by Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X). Note that in this case
Vn : Tn → C is measurable and satisfies νn ◦ V −1n ∈ T (C) in a trivial way.
Our asymptotic result also concerns tight families of games with a finite number
of players, which are defined as follows. Let Γ be a family of games with a finite
number of players and, for every game γ ∈ Γ, let Vγ be the function describing it and
nγ be its number of players. We say that Γ is a tight family of games with a finite
number of players if the family of Borel probability measures {νnγ ◦V −1γ }γ∈Γ is tight.
In games with a finite number of players, each player has a small but positive
impact on the distributions of actions. This is in contrast with the case of games with
a continuum of players. Formally, G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) is a game with a continuum
of players if (T, Σ, ϕ) is an atomless probability space.
An important special case for the space of players is obtained when it equals
the unit interval [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure λ on its Borel σ – algebra
B([0, 1]). Another particular case considered in our results is obtained when the space
of players is super-atomless. Formally, (T, Σ, ϕ) is super-atomless if for every E ∈ Σ
with ϕ(E) > 0, the subspace of L1(ϕ) consisting of the elements of L1(ϕ) vanishing
off E is non-separable. This notion was first introduced by Podczeck (2007b).
Given a game G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V,X), a strategy f , x ∈ X, and t ∈ T such that
{t} ∈ Σ, let f \t x denote the strategy obtained if player t changes his choice from
f(t) to x. Formally, f \t x denotes the strategy g defined by g(t) = x, and g(t̃) = f(t̃),
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for all t̃ 6= t.4 For all measurable subset S of X and ε, η ≥ 0, we say that f is an
(ε, η) – equilibrium of G relative to S if f(t) ∈ S a.e. t ∈ T and
ϕ ({t ∈ T : U(t)(f) ≥ U(t)(f \t x)− ε for all x ∈ S}) ≥ 1− η.5 (2)
Thus, in an (ε, η) – equilibrium relative to S, almost all players play an action in the
closure of S and only a small fraction of players can gain more than ε by deviating
from f to an action in S. A strategy f is an ε – equilibrium of Gn relative to S if
it is an (ε, η) – equilibrium relative to S for η = 0. Furthermore, a strategy f is a
Nash equilibrium of G relative to S if it is an ε – equilibrium of G relative to S for
ε = 0. A strategy f is a Nash equilibrium of G (resp. (ε, η) – equilibrium of G and ε –
equilibrium of G) if f is a Nash equilibrium of G (resp. (ε, η) – equilibrium of G and
ε – equilibrium of G) relative to X. We note that in the particular case where S is
finite, we have that f is a Nash equilibrium of G relative to S if and only if f is a Nash
equilibrium of the game G̃ = ((T, Σ, ϕ), Ṽ , S) with Ṽ defined by Ṽ (t) = V (t)|S×M(S)
for all t ∈ T .
We also describe a game with a continuum of players by a tight Borel probability
measure µ on C. This description is, in fact, equivalent to the one provided above:
given G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X), we obtain a tight Borel probability measure µ = ϕ◦V −1 ∈
T (C); conversely, every probability measure µ ∈ T (C) can be represented by the
distribution induced by a function from the unit interval, endowed with the Lebesgue
measure on its Borel σ – algebra, into C, i.e., there exists a measurable function
V : [0, 1] → C such that µ = λ ◦ V −1 (see Kallenberg (1997, Lemma 2.22, page 34)).
Given a Borel probability measure τ on C × X, we denote by τC and τX the
marginal distributions of τ on C and X respectively. For all subsets S of X, the
expression u(x, τ) ≥ u(S, τ) means u(x, τ) ≥ u(x′, τ) for all x′ ∈ S. We denote the
4Note that U(t)(f \t x) = V (t)(x, ϕ ◦ (f \t x)−1) if G is a game with a finite number of players,
whereas U(t)(f \t x) = V (t)(x, ϕ ◦ f−1) when G is a game with a continuum of players.
5Note that the set {t ∈ T : V (t)(f(t), ϕ ◦ f−1) ≥ V (t)(x, ϕ ◦ f−1) − ε for all x ∈ S} =
(V, f)−1({(u, y) ∈ C × X : u(y, ϕ ◦ f−1) ≥ u(x, ϕ ◦ f−1) − ε for all x ∈ S}) is measurable. In
fact, {(u, y) ∈ C × X : u(y, ϕ ◦ f−1) ≥ u(x, ϕ ◦ f−1) − ε for all x ∈ S} is closed and (V, f) is
measurable (the latter follows from Fremlin (2003, Proposition 418B, p. 111) since X is separable).
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Prohorov metric on M(C ×X) by ρ̂.
Given a game µ ∈ T (C), a measurable subset S of X and ε ≥ 0, a Borel probability
measure τ on C × X is an ε – equilibrium distribution of µ relative to S if τC = µ,
supp(τX) ⊆ S and
τ({(u, x) ∈ C ×X : u(x, τX) ≥ u(S, τX)− ε}) = 1. (3)
Roughly, in an ε – equilibrium distribution relative to S almost all players play an
action in the closure of S and cannot gain more than ε by deviating to another action
in S. An equilibrium distribution of µ relative to S is an ε – equilibrium distribution
of µ relative to S for ε = 0. An equilibrium distribution of µ is an equilibrium distri-
bution of µ relative to X. For all ε ≥ 0, a Borel probability measure ξ on X is an ε –
equilibrium distribution over actions of µ if there exists an ε – equilibrium distribu-
tion τ of µ such that ξ = τX . An ε – equilibrium distribution of G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X)
relative to S is an ε – equilibrium distribution of ϕ ◦ V −1 relative to S; the notions
of an equilibrium distribution of G relative to S, equilibrium distribution of G and ε
– equilibrium distribution over actions of G are defined analogously.
Let K be a subset of C. We say that K is equicontinuous if for all η > 0 there
exists a δ > 0 such that max{ρ(π, τ), d(x, y)} < δ implies |V (x, π)− V (y, τ)| < η for
all V ∈ K and for all x, y ∈ X and π, τ ∈ M(X) (see Rudin (1976, p. 156)). In our
framework, equicontinuity can be interpreted as placing “a bound on the diversity of
payoffs” (see Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997)).
3 Existence of Pure Equilibria in Large Games
In this section we state our equivalence results. Our first result states that the exis-
tence of an equilibrium distribution in games with a continuum of players is equivalent
to the existence of approximate equilibria in sufficiently large games.
Theorem 1 Let X be a separable metric space, M be a compact subset of X and
U ⊆ C. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
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1. For all games with a continuum of players µ ∈ T (U), there exists an equilibrium
distribution τ of µ such that supp(τX) ⊆ M .
2. For all equicontinuous subsets K of U and ε > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and
{x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ M such that for all n ≥ N , all games with a finite number of
players Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with Vn(Tn) ⊆ K have an ε – equilibrium fn
satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}.
3. For all tight families of games with a finite number of players Γ satisfying {νnγ ◦
V −1γ }γ∈Γ ⊆ T (U) and ε, η > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ M
such that for all n ≥ N , all games Gn ∈ Γ have an (ε, η) – equilibrium fn
satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}.
This result clearly stresses the relationship between equilibrium distributions of
games with a continuum of players and approximate equilibria of large finite games. In
fact, Theorem 1 shows that the existence problem for large games can be equivalently
addressed either in its exact version in games with a continuum of players or in an
approximate version in large (equicontinuous or tight) games.
We remark that the conditions in Theorem 1 are neither always true nor always
false. For instance, when U = C, they hold if and only if X is compact.6 Furthermore,
they hold if, for example, U is the subspace of C consisting of the constant functions.
We note that the compact support assumption used in conditions 1 – 3 plays an
important role in Theorem 1 since it allows us to obtain equilibrium distributions
using a limit argument and to establish the existence of a finite-valued Nash equilib-
rium in games with a continuum of players. Its existence cannot be dispensed with.
In fact, if conditions 1 and 2 were to be changed to
(a) For all games with a continuum of players µ ∈ T (U), there exists an equilibrium
distribution τ of µ
and
6See the working paper version of this paper for details.
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(b) For all equicontinuous subsets K of U and ε > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and
{x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X such that for all n ≥ N , all games with a finite number of
players Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with Vn(Tn) ⊆ K have an ε – equilibrium fn
satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm},
respectively, then neither would condition (a) imply condition (b) nor would condition
(b) imply condition (a) (a similar conclusion holds regarding an analogous variation
of condition 3). Thus, Theorem 1 would be false without the compact support re-
quirement.
The above claim is established by the following examples. The first shows that
condition (b) does not imply condition (a). Let X = (0, 1), v ∈ C defined by v(x, π) =
x for all x ∈ X and π ∈M(X) and let U = {v}. Then, for all equicontinuous subsets
K of U and ε > 0, let N = 2, m = 1 and x1 = 1 − ε. Thus, fn ≡ x1 is an ε –
equilibrium of every game with a finite number of players Gn satisfying Vn(Tn) ⊆ U .
However, it is clear that no µ ∈ T (U) has an equilibrium distribution.
The second example shows that condition (a) does not imply condition (b). Let
X = R with metric d(x, y) = |x − y|/(1 + |x − y|), vx ∈ C be defined by vx(x′, π) =
−d(x, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X and U = {vx}x∈X . Let µ ∈ T (U) and V : [0, 1] → U be such
that λ ◦ V −1 = µ. Note that h : R → U defined by h(x) = vx is a homeomorphism
between R and U . Then, f : [0, 1] → R defined by f(t) = h−1◦V is a Nash equilibrium
of G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V, X) and so τ = λ◦(V, f)−1 is an equilibrium distribution
of µ. Let K = U and so K is equicontinuous. Since X is not totally bounded, there
exists ε > 0 such that for all finite subsets F of X, there exists x ∈ X such that
d(x, x′) > ε for all x′ ∈ F . Let m,n ∈ N and {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X be given and let
x ∈ X be such that d(x, x′) > ε for all x′ ∈ {x1, . . . , xm}. Then, letting n = N and
Gn be such that Vn(t) = vx for all t ∈ Tn, it follows that if fn is an ε – equilibrium of
Gn, then fn(t) 6∈ {x1, . . . , xm}.
Our second equivalence result states that the existence of an equilibrium distrib-
ution in games with a continuum of players is equivalent to the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in games with a super-atomless space of players.
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Theorem 2 Let X be a separable metric space and U ⊆ C. Then, the following
conditions are equivalent:
1. An equilibrium distribution exists for all games with a continuum of players
µ ∈ T (U).
2. A Nash equilibrium exists for all games G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) with V (T ) ⊆ U
and a super-atomless probability space of players.
Theorem 2 implies that the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in games
with a super-atomless space of players can be addressed either in terms of strategies
or in terms of distributions. Furthermore, it shows that super-atomless spaces are
rich enough to solve the measurability problems that one encounters when working
with simpler spaces, and which prevent, in general, the existence of an equilibrium
strategy.
Our third equivalence result states that the existence of an equilibrium distribu-
tion in games with a continuum of players is equivalent to the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in games with a finite action space and a Lebesgue space of players. Such
an equivalence is obtained through the use of relative equilibrium since it allows for
the common action space X to be used in both statements even though X may not
be finite. Ideally, the statement would assert the equivalence of the following two
conditions:
For all games with a continuum of players µ ∈ T (U) and all closed subsets
S of X, there exists an equilibrium distribution τ of µ relative to S,
and
For all games with a continuum of players G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V, X)
with V ([0, 1]) ⊆ U and all finite subsets F of X, there exists a Nash
equilibrium f of G relative to F .
However, as in Theorem 1 (and as explained below), a common compact support
assumption is needed for such result. But assuming the existence of a compact subset
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M of X such that supp(τX) ⊆ M and supp(λ ◦ f−1) ⊆ M is not enough. In fact,
when X is not compact, there is a finite subset F of X such that F ∩M = ∅, and so
neither µ nor G have an equilibrium relative to F ; thus, without assuming that both
M ∩ S and M ∩ F are nonempty, the above conditions would be false even when a
common compact support is assumed.
Theorem 3 Let X be a separable metric space, M be a compact subset of X and
U ⊆ C. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. For all games with a continuum of players µ ∈ T (U) and all closed subsets S
of X such that M ∩S is nonempty, there exists an equilibrium distribution τ of
µ relative to S such that supp(τX) ⊆ M .
2. For all games with a continuum of players G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X) with
V ([0, 1]) ⊆ U and all countable, closed subsets C of X such that M ∩ C is
nonempty, there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G relative to C such that λ ◦
f−1 ⊆ M .
3. For all games with a continuum of players G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X) with
V ([0, 1]) ⊆ U and all finite subsets F of X such that M ∩F is nonempty, there
exists a Nash equilibrium f of G relative to F such that λ ◦ f−1 ⊆ M .
This result shows that although Lebesgue spaces are restrictive in that they require
finite or countable action spaces for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, such a result
is strong enough to derive the existence of an equilibrium distribution, and due to
Theorem 2, a Nash equilibrium of games with a richer space of players.
As in Theorem 1, the existence of a compact support (i.e., the compact subset
of M of X) cannot be dispensed with in Theorem 3. However, unlike Theorem 1,
dropping this requirement from conditions 1 and 2 produces two conditions that are
still equivalent and that imply the one resulting from dropping the same requirement
from condition 3. Moreover, the example used above to show that condition (b) does
not imply condition (a) can still be used to show that the converse is not true.
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Our existence results provide a unifying approach to the existence problem in large
games. In fact, by considering the particular case when X is compact and U = C, we
obtain the classical existence results of Schmeidler (1973), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan
and Sun (1995b) and Khan and Sun (1999). It is interesting to note that each of
these existence theorems can be coupled with our main results to derive the others.
Thus, for instance, Schmeidler’s theorem, together with Theorem 3, implies the result
in Khan and Sun (1995b) (simply by taking X to be countable and M = C = X)
and the one in Mas-Colell (1984) (simply by taking X to be an arbitrarily compact
space and M = S = X). This conclusion, together with Theorem 2, then implies the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with super-atomless space of players, and
so, in particular, in games with an atomless Loeb space of players. Thus, we obtain
the existence result for games with a continuum of players in Khan and Sun (1999).
Furthermore, by Theorem 1, it also implies their existence result for tight games with
a finite but sufficiently large number of players.
Corollary 1 Suppose that X is compact. Then,
1. For all equicontinuous subsets K of C and ε > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and
{x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X such that for all n ≥ N , all games with a finite number of
players Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with Vn(Tn) ⊆ K have an ε – equilibrium fn
satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}.
2. (Khan and Sun) For all tight families of games with a finite number of players
Γ, and ε, η > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X such that for all
n ≥ N , all games Gn ∈ Γ have an (ε, η) – equilibrium fn satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆
{x1, . . . , xm}.
3. (Mas-Colell) An equilibrium distribution exists for all games with a continuum
of players µ ∈M(C).
4. A Nash equilibrium exists for all games G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) with a super-
atomless probability space of players.
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5. (Khan and Sun) A Nash equilibrium exists for all games G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X)
with an atomless Loeb probability space of players.
6. (Khan and Sun) A Nash equilibrium exists for all games with a continuum of
players G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X) with X countable.
7. (Schmeidler) A Nash equilibrium exists for all games with a continuum of play-
ers G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X) with X finite.
4 Proofs and Further Results
The proof of our main results, Theorems 1 — 3, relies on three lemmas which have
some interest in their own right. The first provides a characterization of equilibrium
distributions in terms of approximate equilibria of games with a large, but finite
number of players. Lemma 2 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of finite-
valued approximate equilibria in games with a continuum of players. Finally, Lemma
3 presents a representation result which implies that, in games with a super-atomless
space of players, every equilibrium distribution is the inverse image of a Nash equi-
librium and the function describing the game. These lemmas are stated and proved
in Subsections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively, while the proofs of Theorems 1, 3 and 2
are presented in Subsections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.
4.1 A Characterization of Equilibrium Distributions
In this section we characterize the equilibrium distributions, supported on a given
finite set, of some simple games with a continuum of players. These are games with a
finite number of characteristics and with payoff functions selected from an equicontin-
uous family. Despite all these restrictive assumptions, this result is enough to deduce
the existence of pure strategy approximate equilibria in large finite games from the
existence of an equilibrium distribution with compact support in games with a con-
tinuum of players.
14
The following notation is used in Lemma 1. When F is a finite set and π a
probability measure on F , we write πl instead of π({l}), whenever l ∈ F , and also
π = (π1, . . . , πL), with L = |F |. This notation also suggests that a measure with a
finite support can be thought of as a vector in some Euclidean space. We will also write
||π|| = maxl∈F |πl|, i.e., ||π|| is the sup norm of the vector (π1, . . . , πL). Note that a
sequence of measures {πn}∞n=1 on F converges to π if and only if limn→∞ ||πn−π|| = 0.
Furthermore, for all equicontinuous subsets K of C and V ∈ K, let ωV : R++ → R+,
defined by ωV (δ) = sup{|V (x, π)− V (y, τ)| : max{d(x, y), ρ(π, τ)} ≤ δ} for all δ > 0,
denote the modulus of continuity of V and ωK(δ) = supV ∈K ωV (δ). Of course, since
K is equicontinuous, then limδ→0 ωK(δ) = 0.
Lemma 1 Let S be a finite subset of X, m = |S| and K be an equicontinuous subset
of U . Then, the following holds for all games G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) with a continuum
of players such that V (T ) is a finite subset of K and for all ε ≥ 0:
A Borel probability measure ξ on X is an ε – equilibrium distribution over actions
of G with supp(ξ) ⊆ S if and only if for all games Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with a
finite number of players in which Vn(Tn) is a subset of V (T ) there exists a strategy
fn : Tn → S such that
1. fn is an ε + 2ωK (m||ϕ ◦ V −1 − νn ◦ V −1n ||+ (m2 + 1)/n) – equilibrium of Gn
and
2. ‖νn ◦ f−1n − ξ‖ ≤ ‖ϕ ◦ V −1 − νn ◦ V −1n ‖+ mn .
In order to illustrate the idea of Lemma 1, consider the particular case of a se-
quence of games {Gn} with a finite number of players with Vn(Tn) ⊆ V (T ) and with
||ϕ ◦ V −1 − νn ◦ V −1n || converging to zero. In this case, we can, intuitively, say that
the sequence {Gn} converges to G. If ξ is an equilibrium distribution over actions of
G, then Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of an εn – equilibrium fn of Gn satisfying
εn → 0 and ||νn ◦ f−1n − ξ|| → 0. That is, finite games that are close to G have
approximate equilibria, with a degree of approximation close to zero, whose induced
distributions are close to ξ.
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Conversely, the existence of approximate equilibria of games converging to G, with
a vanishing degree of approximation and with induced distributions converging to ξ,
is enough to show that ξ is an equilibrium distribution over actions of G.
The strength of Lemma 1, which is crucial to the asymptotic result, is that the
degree of approximation involved depends only on ε, on the equicontinuous family K,
on the number of pure strategies m of the set S, on the Euclidean distance between the
distributions of characteristics ||ϕ◦V −1−νn◦V −1n || and on the number of players n. In
particular, it is independent of the particular games G and Gn that we are considering.
So, if ε and the set of actions is fixed, and we are considering games G and Gn with
the same distribution of characteristics, then the degree of approximation depends
only on n. This fact is at the core of our asymptotic result: once n is sufficiently
large, equilibrium distributions of G induce approximate equilibria of Gn.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let S = {x1, . . . , xm} be a finite subset of X and K be an
equicontinuous subset of U . Let ε ≥ 0 and let G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V,X) be a game with
a continuum of players such that V (T ) is a finite subset of K. Let β = ϕ ◦ V −1 and
let supp(β) = {V1, . . . , VL}.
(Necessity) Let ξ be an ε – equilibrium distribution over actions of G with supp(ξ) ⊆
S and let ψ be an ε – equilibrium distribution of G such that ξ = ψX . For all 1 ≤ l ≤ L
and 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let ψl,i = ψ({(Vl, xi)}) and note that
∑m
i=1 ψl,i = βl and
∑L
l=1 ψl,i = ξi.
Since ψ is an ε – equilibrium distribution, it follows that if ψl,i > 0 then, for all x ∈ X,
Vl(xi, ξ) ≥ Vl(x, ξ)− ε. (4)
Let Gn be a game with a finite number of players such that Vn(Tn) is a subset of
V (T ). For all 1 ≤ l ≤ L, let Tn,l = {t ∈ Tn : Vn(t) = Vl} and γn,l = |Tn,l|. Then,
γn = (γn,1, . . . , γn,L) is such that γn/n = νn ◦ V −1n .
Let 1 ≤ l ≤ L be given. Define El = {ei ∈ E : ψl,i > 0} , where E = {e1, . . . , em}
is the standard basis of Rm. Define Et = El if t ∈ Tn,l. If γn,l > 0, it follows that,
El ⊆ 1γn,l
∑
t∈Tn,l Et. Also, we have that ψl/βl = (ψl,1/βl, . . . , ψl,m/βl) ∈ co(El) and
so ψl/βl ∈ co
(
1
γn,l
∑
t∈Tn,l Et
)
= 1
γn,l
∑
t∈Tn,l co(Et).
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Define
τ =
L∑
l=1
γn,l
n
ψl
βl
=
∑
l:γn,l>0
γn,l
n
ψl
βl
. (5)
Then, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it follows that |ξi − τi| ≤
∑L
l=1
ψl,i
βl
∣∣γn,l
n
− βl
∣∣ ≤
∥∥β − γn
n
∥∥ ,
and so ‖ξ − τ‖ ≤
∥∥β − γn
n
∥∥. Hence, by Lemma 4,
ρ(ξ, τ) ≤ m
∥∥∥β − γn
n
∥∥∥ . (6)
Furthermore, τ ∈ ∑l:γn,l>0
γn,l
n
1
γn,l
∑
t∈Tn,l co(Et) =
1
n
∑
t∈Tn co(Et). Thus, by the
Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983, p. 9)), it follows that there are n points
(αt)t∈Tn such that αt ∈ co(Et) for all t ∈ Tn, |{t ∈ Tn : αt 6∈ Et}| ≤ m and
τ =
1
n
∑
t∈Tn
αt (7)
Let 1 ≤ l ≤ L and define Pn = {t ∈ Tn : αt ∈ E}. Define a strategy fn as follows:
if t ∈ Pn, then let ei be such that αt = ei and define fn(t) = xi; if t ∈ P cn := Tn \ Pn
and Vt = Vl, choose 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that ψl,i > 0 and define fn(t) = xi. By (4), it
follows that V (t)(fn(t), ξ) ≥ V (t)(x, ξ)− ε for all t ∈ Tn and x ∈ X.
Let σ = νn ◦ f−1n . We claim that ||τ − σ|| ≤ mn . In fact, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have
that
σi =
∑
t∈Pn
αt,i
n
+
|P cn ∩ f−1n (xi)|
n
=
∑
t∈Pn
αt,i
n
+
∑
t∈P cn∩f−1n (xi)
1
n
(8)
and τi =
∑n
t=1 αt,i/n. Therefore, letting χf−1(xi) denote the characteristic function of
f−1(xi), we obtain that |τi − σi| = 1n
∣∣∣∑t∈P cn
(
αt,i − χf−1(xi)(t)
)∣∣∣ ≤ |P cn|n ≤ mn and so
||τ − σ|| ≤ m/n.
Since νn◦f−1 = σ and ‖ξ−τ‖ ≤ ‖β−γn/n‖, then ‖νn◦f−1−ξ‖ ≤ ‖β−γn/n‖+m/n.
This establishes assertion 2 in the statement of the Lemma.
By Lemma 4, ρ(τ, νn ◦ f−1n ) ≤ m2/n since νn ◦ f−1n = σ. Also, by Lemma 5, it
follows that ρ(νn ◦ f−1n , νn ◦ (fn \t x)−1) ≤ 1/n for all t ∈ Tn and x ∈ X. Hence, using
(6), it follows that ρ(νn ◦ f−1n , ξ) ≤ m ‖β − γn/n‖+ m2/n and
ρ(νn ◦ (fn \t x)−1, ξ) ≤ m
∥∥∥β − γn
n
∥∥∥ + m
2 + 1
n
. (9)
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For convenience, let θ = m
∥∥β − γn
n
∥∥ + m2+1
n
. Hence, for all t ∈ Tn and x ∈ X, we
obtain
V (t)(fn(t), νn ◦ f−1n ) ≥ V (t)(fn(t), ξ)− ωK(θ)
≥ V (t)(x, ξ)− ε− ωK(θ) ≥ V (t)(x, νn ◦ (fn \t x)−1)− ε− 2ωK(θ).
(10)
Therefore, fn is an ε + 2ωK(m‖β − γn/n‖+ (m2 + 1)/n) – equilibrium of Gn.
(Sufficiency) Let ξ be a distribution over X satisfying the condition. Let {qn} ⊆
QL+ be such that qn → β. For all n ∈ N, there exist γn = (γn,1, . . . , γn,L) ∈ NL and
kn ∈ N such that qn = γn/kn. By multiplying both kn and γn by n if necessary, we
may assume that kn ≥ n. Define, for all n, a game Gkn = ((Tkn , Σkn , νkn), Vkn , X)
where Vkn satisfies |{t ∈ Tkn : Vkn(t) = Vl}| = γn,l for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
For all n, let fkn satisfy 1 and 2. Consider the sequence {νkn ◦ (Vkn , fkn)−1}n ⊆
M({V1, . . . , VL} × S). Since M({V1, . . . , VL} × S) is compact, taking a subsequence
if necessary, we may assume that it converges. Let τ = limn νkn ◦ (Vkn , fkn)−1. Then,
τU = β = λ◦V −1, τX = ξ and supp(ξ) ⊆ S since, respectively, νkn◦V −1kn = γn/kn → β,
||νkn ◦ f−1kn − ξ|| ≤ ||β − γn/kn|| + m/kn → 0 and fkn(Tkn) ⊆ S for all n. Since
νkn ◦ (Vkn , fkn)−1 converges to τ , fkn is an ε + 2ωK(m
∥∥∥β − γnkn
∥∥∥ + m2+1kn ) – equilibrium
of Gkn and limn(m
∥∥∥β − γnkn
∥∥∥ + m2+1kn ) = 0, it follows, by Lemma 6, that τ is an ε –
equilibrium distribution of G. Thus, ξ is an ε – equilibrium distribution over action
of G with supp(ξ) ⊆ S.
4.2 Finite-valued Equilibria
In this subsection we address the existence of finite-valued approximate equilibria.
Lemma 2 considers games with a continuum of players where the set of players’
characteristics is a countable subset of an equicontinuous family. It guarantees the
existence of a finite set of actions with the property that all such games have an
approximate equilibrium strategy taking values in this finite set. The strength of this
result is that the finite set works uniformly for all such games, i.e., it depends only
on the equicontinuous set and on the degree of approximation desired. Since Lemma
1 only applies to games with finite action space, these properties are useful in order
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to demonstrate part of Theorem 1 using that lemma.
Lemma 2 Let M be a compact subset of X and K be an equicontinuous subset of
U . Then, for all ε > 0, there exists a finite subset {x1, . . . , xm} of M such that the
following holds:
If τ is an equilibrium distribution of a game with a continuum of players G =
((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) with V (T ) ⊆ K countable and satisfies supp(τX) ⊆ M , then there ex-
ists an ε – equilibrium strategy g such that g(T ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm} and ρ̂(ϕ◦(V, g)−1, τ) <
ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Since K is equicontinuous, there exists δ > 0 such that
max{d(x, y), ρ(π, ψ)} < δ implies that |u(x, π) − u(y, ψ)| < ε/2 for all x, y ∈ X,
π, ψ ∈M(X) and u ∈ K. We can choose δ < ε.
Let {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ M be such that M ⊆ ∪mj=1Bδ/2(xj). Define B1 = Bδ/2(x1) and
Bj = Bδ/2(xj) \
(∪j−1l=1 Bδ/2(xl)
)
for all 2 ≤ j ≤ m.
Let G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V,X) be a game with a continuum of players such that V (T )
is a countable subset of K and let τ be an equilibrium distribution of G. It follows
from Carmona (2008, Theorem 1) that there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G such
that τ = ϕ ◦ (V, f)−1 and f(T ) ⊆ M .
Define g : T → {x1, . . . , xm} by g(t) = xj if f(t) ∈ Bj. Then, g is measurable
and d(f(t), g(t)) < δ/2 for all t ∈ T . This implies that {t ∈ T : (V (t), g(t)) ∈
D} ⊆ {t ∈ T : (V (t), f(t)) ∈ Bδ/2(D)} for all Borel measurable subsets D of U ×X
and so ϕ ◦ (V, g)−1(D) ≤ ϕ ◦ (V, f)−1(Bδ/2(D)) + δ/2. Similarly, one can show that
ϕ ◦ (V, f)−1(D) ≤ ϕ ◦ (V, g)−1(Bδ/2(D)) + δ/2. Thus, ρ̂(ϕ ◦ (V, g)−1, τ) ≤ δ/2 < ε.
Analogously, we can show that ρ(ϕ ◦ g−1, ϕ ◦ f−1) ≤ δ/2 < δ.
This implies that for almost all t ∈ T and all x ∈ X, V (t)(g(t), ϕ ◦ g−1) >
V (t)(f(t), ϕ ◦ f−1)− ε/2 ≥ V (t)(x, ϕ ◦ f−1)− ε/2 > V (t)(x, ϕ ◦ g−1)− ε. Hence, g is
an ε – equilibrium of G.
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4.3 A Representation Result for Distributions
In this subsection, we characterize equilibrium distributions of games with a super-
atomless space of players in terms of its Nash equilibria. Such a characterization
(Corollary 2) is a direct consequence of Lemma 3, which is a representation result for
tight measures. In general, every tight measure τ on a metric Y can be represented
as the inverse image of a measurable function h, mapping the unit interval into Y .
However, if Y = A×B and τA = λ ◦ g−1, where g : [0, 1] → A, in general, there is no
f : [0, 1] → B such that τ = λ ◦ (g, f)−1. Lemma 3 shows that the existence of such
a function f provided that the probability space ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ) is replaced by a
super-atomless one.
Lemma 3 Let A and B be metric spaces, (T, Σ, ϕ) be a super-atomless probability
space, τ be a tight Borel probability measure on A×B and g : T → A be a measurable
function such that τA = ϕ◦g−1. Then, there is a measurable function f : T → B such
that τ = ϕ ◦ (g, f)−1.
Proof. We claim that we may assume, without loss of generality, that A and
B are compact metric spaces. In order to establish this claim, we first show if the
conclusion of the lemma holds when A and B are Polish spaces, it also holds when
they are arbitrary metric spaces.
In order to establish this latter claim, let A and B be arbitrary metric spaces. Since
τ is tight, so are τA and τB. Thus, we can find an increasing sequence {An}∞n=1 of
compact subsets of A such that τA(∪nAn) = 1, and an increasing sequence {Bn}∞n=1 of
compact subsets of B such that τB(∪nBn) = 1. Note that we must have τ((∪nAn)×
(∪nBn)) = 1 and (∪nAn) × (∪nBn) = ∪n(An × Bn), so we may view τ as a tight
distribution on (∪nAn) × (∪nBn). Furthermore, changing g on a null set if needed,
we may assume that it takes all of its values in ∪nAn, and we may then assume as
well that A = ∪nAn and B = ∪nBn.
It then follows by Schwartz (1973, Corollary 2, p. 103, Corollary 3, p. 103, and
Definition 2, p. 94) that there is a Polish topology ηA on A which is stronger than
the original topology of A, but which generates the same Borel σ-algebra on A as
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the original one. Similarly, there is a Polish topology ηB on B, stronger than the
original topology of B, but generating the same Borel σ-algebra on B as the original
topology of B. In particular, then, the product topology ηA × ηB is stronger than
the original product topology of A × B. Note also that since ηA and ηB are Polish
topologies, the product of the Borel σ-algebras generated by ηA and ηB coincides with
the Borel σ-algebra generated by the product topology ηA × ηB. Consequently, the
Borel σ-algebra generated by the product topology ηA×ηB coincides with the original
Borel σ-algebra of A × B. In view of these facts, we may assume that A and B are
Polish spaces.
Finally, we show that if the conclusion of the lemma holds when A and B are
compact metric spaces, it also holds when they are Polish spaces. Recall that if
C and D are any two Polish spaces of the same cardinality, then they are Borel
isomorphic, i.e., there is a bijection ξ : C → D such that both ξ and its inverse
ξ−1 are Borel measurable, and recall that the cardinality of a Polish space is finite,
countable infinite, or that of the continuum. Thus, since any compact metric space
is a Polish space, we may assume, in fact, that both A and B are compact metric
spaces. This establishes the above claim.
Let x 7→ τx be a disintegration of τ . Thus, for each x ∈ A, τx is a Borel probability
measure on B, and for each Borel set C ⊆ A×B,
τ(C) =
∫
A
τx(Cx)dτA(x), (11)
where Cx ⊆ B is the x-section of C. Note that for each x ∈ A and each Borel set
C ⊆ A×B, writing δx for the Dirac measure at x ∈ A,
δx ⊗ τx(C) =
∫
A
τx′(Cx′)dδx(x
′) = τx(Cx), (12)
where the first equality follows by Fubini’s theorem. Let φ : T → M(A × B) be
the mapping defined by φ(t) = δg(t) ⊗ τg(t). Then φ is measurable in the sense that
t 7→ φ(t)(C) is measurable for each Borel set C ⊆ A×B (because t 7→ φ(t)(C) is the
composition of the measurable mapping g with the measurable mapping x 7→ τx(Cx)),
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and for any Borel set C ⊆ A×B,
∫
T
φ(t)(C)dϕ(t) =
∫
T
δg(t) ⊗ τg(t)(C)dϕ(t)
=
∫
A
δx ⊗ τx(C)d(ϕ ◦ g−1)(x) =
∫
A
δx ⊗ τx(C)dτA(x)
=
∫
A
τx(Cx)dτA(x) = τ(C),
(13)
where the two last equalities follow from (12) and (11), respectively. Since (T, Σ, ϕ)
is super-atomless, Corollary 1 in Podczeck (2007a) provides a measurable function
h : T → A × B such that h(t) ∈ supp(φ(t)) for almost all t ∈ T , and for all Borel
sets C ⊆ A × B, ∫
T
φ(t)(C)dϕ(t) = ϕ(h−1(C)). Thus, it follows from above that
τ = ϕ ◦ h−1. For the function h we can write h = (e, f) with e = projA ◦ h and
f = projB ◦ h; in particular, both e and f are measurable and τ = ϕ ◦ (e, f)−1. Also,
for almost all t ∈ T , (e(t), f(t)) = h(t) ∈ supp(φ(t)) = supp(δg(t)⊗τg(t)) ⊆ {g(t)}×B.
Consequently e(t) = g(t) for almost all t ∈ T , and hence τ = ϕ ◦ (g, f)−1.
Lemma 3 immediately implies the following characterization of equilibrium distri-
butions in games with super-atomless space of players.
Corollary 2 Let (T, Σ, ϕ) be a super-atomless probability space. Then, τ is an equi-
librium distribution of G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V,X) if and only if there exists a Nash equilib-
rium f of G such that τ = ϕ ◦ (V, f)−1.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 1
We start by establishing that condition 1 implies condition 2. Let K be an equicon-
tinuous subset of U and ε > 0. Let {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X be given by Lemma 2 and
correspond to K, M and ε/2. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that 2ωK(m2+1n ) < ε/2 for
all n ≥ N .7
Let Gn be a game with a finite number of players with Vn(Tn) ⊆ K and n ≥ N .
Consider the following game with a continuum of players: G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X)
where V (t) = Vn(i) if t ∈ [ i−1n , in) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 and V (t) = Vn(n) if t ∈ [n−1n , 1].
7Recall that, for all δ > 0, ωK(δ) = supV ∈K sup{|V (x, π)− V (y, τ)| : max{d(x, y), ρ(π, τ)} ≤ δ}.
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Note that λ ◦ V −1 = νn ◦ V −1n ∈ T (U). By condition 1, G has an equilibrium distrib-
ution τ such that supp(τX) ⊆ M . Since V ([0, 1]) is a finite subset of K, it follows by
Lemma 2 that G has ε/2 – equilibrium f with f([0, 1]) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}.
By Lemma 1, there exists a ε/2 + 2ωK((m
2 + 1)/n) – equilibrium fn of Gn. Since
2ωK((m
2 +1)/n) < ε/2, then fn is an ε – equilibrium of Gn. This concludes the proof
that condition 1 implies condition 2.
The same scheme can be used to prove that condition 1 implies condition 3.
Let Γ be a tight family of games with a finite set of players, ε > 0 and η > 0.
Let K be a compact subset of U satisfying νn ◦ V −1n (K) > 1 − η for all Gn ∈ Γ.
Then, let {x1, . . . , xm} be given by Lemma 2 and correspond to K, M and ε/2.
Following the same arguments used above, we can show that Vn(t)(f(t), νn ◦ f−1) ≥
Vn(t)(x, νn◦(f \tx)−1)−ε for all x ∈ X and all t ∈ V −1n (K). Since, νn◦V −1n (K) > 1−η
for all Gn ∈ Γ, the result follows.
We turn to the proof that condition 2 implies condition 1. Let µ ∈ T (U) be a
game with a continuum of players. Since µ is tight, it has a separable support. Hence,
it follows by Parthasarathy (1967, Theorem II.6.3, p.44) that there exists a sequence
{µk}k ∈ M(supp(µ)) converging to µ ∈ M(supp(µ)) and such that supp(µk) is
finite and µk({v}) ∈ Q for all v ∈ supp(µk) and k ∈ N. For all k, let supp(µk) =
{V 1k , . . . , V Lkk }; also, let tk ∈ N and, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ Lk, βlk ∈ N be such that
βlk/tk = µk({V lk}).
Let k ∈ N be fixed. Then {V lk}1≤l≤Lk is an equicontinuous subset of U . Define,
for all γ ∈ N, a game Gγtk = ((Tγtk , νγtk), Vγtk , X) as follows: Gγtk has γtk players,
each has X as his choice set and their payoff functions are defined in the following
way: Vγtk : Tγtk → U is such that it associates V lk to γβlk players, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ Lk.
By condition 2, Gγktk has a 1/k – equilibrium fγktk : Tγktk → M if we choose γk
sufficiently large. We may also choose γk so that γktk > k, which implies that the
sequence {γktk}∞k=1 converges to infinity. Let τk = νγktk ◦ (Vγktk , fγktk)−1 ∈M(U ×X).
Since supp(µ) is separable, {τU ,k}k converges to µ and both µ and τU ,k are tight
for all k, it follows that {µ, τU ,1, τU ,2, . . .}, and so {τU ,k}k is tight by Hildenbrand
(1974, Theorem 32, p. 49). Also, since M is compact and supp(τk,X) ⊆ M for all k,
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then {τX,1, τX,2, . . .} is tight. Thus, {τk}k is tight (Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 35,
p. 50)) and, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that {τk} converges
(Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 31, p. 49)). Let τ = limk τk. Then, by Lemma 6,
it follows that τ is an equilibrium distribution of τU = µ. Furthermore, τX(M) ≥
lim supk τk,X(M) = 1 and so supp(τX) ⊆ M .
Similarly, we show that condition 3 implies condition 1. We can use the same
argument used in the proof that condition 2 implies condition 1, except that fγktk
is only a (1/k, 1/k) – equilibrium of Gγktk . However, Lemma 6 still applies and the
conclusion follows.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 2
It follows from Corollary 2 that condition 1 implies condition 2. So, it suffices to show
that condition 2 implies condition 1. Let µ ∈ T (U) be a game with a continuum of
players. By Kallenberg (1997, Lemma 2.22, page 34), there exists a Borel measurable
function V : [0, 1] → U such that µ = λ ◦ V −1 (recall that λ denotes the Lebesgue
measure). By Podczeck (2007a, Appendix), there exists a super-atomless measure
ϕ on [0, 1] such that, denoting by Σ the domain of ϕ, B([0, 1]) ⊆ Σ and ϕ agrees
with λ on B([0, 1]). Clearly, V is still measurable when B([0, 1]) is replaced by Σ and
µ = ϕ ◦ V −1. Indeed, for all measurable C ⊆ U , V −1(C) ∈ B([0, 1]), and so µ(C) =
λ(V −1(C)) = ϕ(V −1(C)) = ϕ ◦ V −1(C). By condition 2, G = (([0, 1], Σ, ϕ), V,X) has
a Nash equilibrium f . Hence, τ = ϕ ◦ (V, f)−1 is an equilibrium distribution of µ.
4.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Note that condition 2 trivially implies condition 3. Thus, it suffices to prove that
condition 1 implies condition 2 and that condition 3 implies condition 1.
Assume that condition 1 holds. Let G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X) be a game with
a continuum of players with V ([0, 1]) ⊆ U and C be a countable, closed subset of X
such that M ∩ C 6= ∅. By condition 1, there exists an equilibrium distribution τ of
µ = λ ◦V −1 relative to C. Note that supp(τX) ⊆ C, since C is closed. It then follows
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by Khan and Sun (1995a, Theorem 2) that there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G
relative to C such that τ = λ ◦ (V, f)−1. Thus, condition 2 holds.
Assume that condition 3 holds. Let µ ∈ T (U) be a game with a continuum of
players and let S be a closed subset of X such that M ∩S 6= ∅. Let C = {xm}∞m=1 be
a countable dense subset of S. We claim that it suffices to establish that there exists
an equilibrium distribution τ of µ relative to C. In fact, given such a distribution τ ,
since C is dense in S, it follows that supp(τX) ⊆ C = S and that the set {(u, x) ∈
U × X : u(x, τX) ≥ u(S, τX)} is equal to {(u, x) ∈ U × X : u(x, τX) ≥ u(C, τX)}.
Hence, τ({(u, x) ∈ U × X : u(x, τX) ≥ u(S, τX)} = 1 and so τ is an equilibrium
distribution of µ relative to S.
We then establish the existence of an equilibrium distribution τ of µ relative to
C. Since supp(µ) is a closed (hence, complete) and separable subset of U , it follows
by Kallenberg (1997, Lemma 2.22, page 34) that there exists a Borel measurable
function V : [0, 1] → U such that µ = λ ◦V −1 and so we can represent the game µ by
G = (([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ), V,X). For all k ∈ N, define Fk = {x1, . . . , xk}. By condition
3, there exists a Nash equilibrium fk of G relative to Fk for all k. Let τk = λ◦(V, fk)−1
for all k. Since τk,U = λ ◦ V −1 and supp(τk,X) ⊆ C ⊆ M for all k, it follows that
the sequence {τk}k is tight and so, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume
that it converges. Let τ = limk τk. Clearly, supp(τX) ⊆ C ⊆ M . We next establish
that τ is an equilibrium distribution of µ relative to C.
Let (u, x) ∈ supp(τ) and m ∈ N. For all k ∈ N, define Ak = {(u, x) ∈ U × X :
u(x, τk,X) < u(y, τk,X) for some y ∈ Fk}. Since τk is an equilibrium distribution of G
relative to Fk, it follows that τk(Ak) = 0 for all k ∈ N. By Lemma 7, there exists
a subsequence {τkj}∞j=1 of {τk}∞k=1 and, for each j ∈ N, (uj, xj) ∈ supp(τkj) \ Akj
such that limj(uj, xj) = (u, x). Then, uj(xj, τkj ,X) ≥ uj(xm, τkj ,X) for all j ∈ N
such that kj ≥ m. Since limj uj = u, limj τkj = τ , and limj xj = x, it follows that
u(x, τX) ≥ u(xm, τX). Since (u, x) ∈ supp(τ) and m ∈ N were chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that supp(τ) ⊆ {(u, x) ∈ U ×X : u(x, τX) ≥ u(xm, τX) for all m ∈ N} and so
τ is an equilibrium distribution of µ relative to C.
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4.7 On the Asymptotic Existence Result
In this section, we show that in general, we cannot obtain a pure Nash equilibrium
even in equicontinuous large games. The exact version of condition 1 in Corollary 1
(i.e., with ε = 0) therefore holds only in the limit case of games with a continuum
of players. As an easy consequence, we also show that it is not possible to dispense
with the equicontinuity assumption used in that condition.
In order to establish the above claim, we show that there exists an equicontinuous
subset K of U and m ∈ N such that for all N ∈ N there exists a game Gn =
((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with n ≥ N and Vn(Tn) ⊆ K which has no Nash equilibrium.
Let X = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} = {e1, e2} ⊆ R2, and for all N ∈ N, we let n ≥ N be
a multiple of 4 (e.g., n = 4N). Define Gn as follows: let T1 = {1, . . . , n/2} and
T2 = {n/2 + 1, . . . , n}. For t ∈ T1, let
V (t)(e1, µ) =
1
2
− nµ1 − 1
n− 1 and
V (t)(e2, µ) =
nµ1
n− 1 −
1
2
,
(14)
while for t ∈ T2, let V (t)(ei, µ) = −V (1)(ei, µ), i = 1, 2. Note that for all t ∈ T1 and
strategy f = (f1, f2),
U(t)(f \t e1) = 1
2
−
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n− 1 and
U(t)(f \t e2) =
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n− 1 −
1
2
.
(15)
Thus, for t ∈ T1, we have that player t’s optimal choice is:
f1(t) =



1 if
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n−1 <
1
2
,
x ∈ {0, 1} if ∑j 6=t f1(j)n−1 = 12 ,
0 if
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n−1 >
1
2
.
(16)
For any player t ∈ T2, the optimal choice is just the opposite, that is, player t’s
optimal choice is:
f1(t) =



0 if
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n−1 <
1
2
,
x ∈ {0, 1} if ∑j 6=t f1(j)n−1 = 12 ,
1 if
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n−1 >
1
2
.
(17)
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Let K = {V (1),−V (1)}.
We claim that Gn has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let
x̄ =
∑
t∈T
f1(t)
n
,
and
x̄t =
∑
j 6=t
f1(j)
n− 1 =
nx̄− f1(t)
n− 1 ,
for any t ∈ T . We consider the cases x̄ < 1/2, x̄ = 1/2 and x̄ > 1/2.
Assume that f is pure and that x̄ = 1/2. If t ∈ T2 is such that f1(t) = 0, then
x̄t = n/(2n− 2) > 1/2. Therefore, the gain from deviating to e1 is
2x̄t − 1 = 1
n− 1 > 0. (18)
Similarly, if t ∈ T2 is such that f1(t) = 1, then x̄t = (n − 2)/(2n − 2) < 1/2, and
player t gains by deviating to e2.
If x̄ < 1/2, then x̄ ≤ 1/2 − 1/n and there exists t ∈ T1 such that f1(t) = 0. It
follows that x̄t < 1/2, implying that player t is not optimizing. Finally, if x̄ > 1/2,
then x̄ ≥ 1/2 + 1/n and there exists t ∈ T1 such that f1(t) = 1. Thus, x̄t > 1/2 and
so player t is not optimizing. It follows from the analysis of the above three cases
that Gn has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The above example can be modified to show that we cannot dispense with the
equicontinuity assumption in condition 1 in Corollary 1.
Let n ∈ N and Gn be as defined above. Since Gn has no pure strategy Nash
equilibria, it follows that there exists εn > 0 with the property that no pure strategy
is an εn – equilibrium of Gn. In fact, the set of pure strategy is compact (it can
be identified with {e1, e2}n); thus, if this claim were to be false, we would obtain a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium from a sequence of pure εn – equilibria with the cor-
responding sequence of εn converging to zero. Thus, define G̃n = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Ṽn, X)
by letting Ṽ (t) = V (t)/εn for all t ∈ Tn. Then, it follows that G̃n has no pure strategy
1 – equilibria.
Note that it follows by Corollary 1 that εn → 0. This shows that the family of
payoff functions we used in the example is not equicontinuous and accounts for the
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failure of the conclusion of Theorem 1.
Finally, we note that the games used in the above examples are such that each
player’s payoff depends only on his choice and the average choice of the others. This
shows that even if we restrict attention to this class of games, we cannot obtain a pure
ε – equilibrium for all ε > 0 for all sufficiently large games without equicontinuity.
This last conclusion generalizes the result in Carmona (2004b): since for the non-
equicontinuous game in our example there is no pure ε – equilibrium for all ε > 0
small enough, then it follows that no mixed strategy equilibrium can be ε – purified.
4.8 On the Necessity of Compact Spaces
In this subsection, we show that the action space being compact is not only sufficient
but also necessary for the existence of equilibria when U = C and X is separable and
complete.
Theorem 4 Suppose that X is a complete, separable metric space. The following
conditions are equivalent:
1. X is compact.
2. For all games with a continuum of players µ ∈ T (C), there exists an equilibrium
distribution τ of µ.
3. For all equicontinuous subsets K of C and ε > 0, there exists m,N ∈ N and
{x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ M such that for all n ≥ N , all games with a finite number of
players Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with Vn(Tn) ⊆ K have an ε – equilibrium fn
satisfying fn(Tn) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xm}.
Proof. We start by showing that condition 1 is equivalent to condition 2. If X
is compact, i.e., condition 1 holds, it follows from Mas-Colell (1984, Theorem 1) that
condition 2 holds. Conversely, suppose that condition 1 does not hold. Then, there
exists a continuous, bounded function f : X → R+ that does not attain its maximum
in X. In fact, there exists an unbounded, continuous function h : X → R+ (see Lima
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(1993, Example 16, p. 224)). Then, let d̄ be a metric in R+ and define g : R+ → R by
g(x) = −d̄(x,∞)/(1+ d̄(x,∞)) and f : X → R by f = g ◦h. Clearly, f(X) ⊆ [−1, 0].
Note that g is continuous and so is h when viewed as a function to R+. This implies
that f is also continuous. Since h is unbounded, then supx∈X f(x) = 0, but f(x) < 0
since h(X) ⊆ R. Hence, f is a bounded, continuous, real-valued function that does
not attain its maximum in X.
Thus, let ṽ ∈ C be defined by ṽ(x, φ) = f(x) for all x ∈ X and φ ∈ M(X) and
µ ∈ T (C) by µ({ṽ}) = 1. Then, µ has no equilibrium distribution. In conclusion,
condition 2 does not hold.
Suppose next that condition 2 holds. Then, by the above, X is compact and
it follows that condition 2 in Theorem 1 holds when U = C and M = X. Then,
condition 3 follows from Theorem 1.
Finally, we show that condition 3 implies condition 1. Assume that X is not
compact. We may assume the metric d on X is bounded (if not, replace it by the
equivalent metric d̄ defined by d̄(x, y) = d(x, y)/(1 + d(x, y)) for all x, y ∈ X). Since
X is complete, then X is not totally bounded. For all x ∈ X, let vx ∈ C be defined by
vx(x
′, φ) = −d(x′, x) for all x′ ∈ X and φ ∈M(X) and define K = {vx}x∈X . Clearly,
K is equicontinuous.
Since X is not totally bounded, there exists ε > 0 such that for all finite subsets
F of X, there exists x ∈ X such that d(x, x′) > ε for all x′ ∈ F . Let m, n ∈ N
and {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ X be given and let x ∈ X be such that d(x, x′) > ε for all
x′ ∈ {x1, . . . , xm}. Then, letting n = N and Gn be such that vn(t) = vx for all
t ∈ Tn, it follows that if fn is an ε – equilibrium of Gn, then fn(t) 6∈ {x1, . . . , xm}. In
conclusion, condition 2 does not hold.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have considered several existence results for large games with the
purpose of establishing their equivalence. In our view, such equivalence is important
since it expresses the close relationship between the different formalizations of large
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games and their corresponding equilibrium notions. In particular, all the existence
results are equally strong and so none of the formalizations we consider should be
regarded as better suited to address the existence problem of large games.
Furthermore, our equivalence results also imply that the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different equilibrium concepts and formalizations are more apparent
than substantial. In fact, as their proofs make clear, it is possible to obtain an
equilibrium in one model using an equilibrium (or a sequence of equilibria) in another
one. Thus, a critique (resp. praise) to a particular equilibrium concept in some given
formalization, implies a critique (resp. praise) to all the other equilibrium concepts
(from which the original one can be obtained).
To illustrate this point consider a game with an uncountable action space. Then,
an equilibrium strategy will exist if the space of players is super-atomless. However,
an equilibrium distribution exists under exactly the same assumptions. Furthermore,
all games with the same distribution of players’ characteristics as the original game
but with a Lebesgue space of players have an equilibrium relative to a (finitely) dis-
cretisized action space, and, by choosing the discrete action space close to the original
one, these strategies can be made arbitrarily close to an equilibrium distribution of
the original game. Thus, as long as one is only interested in the strategic behavior
displayed in such equilibrium, all three methods of reaching such equilibrium should
deserve the same appraisal.
In conclusion, as far as the existence problem is concerned, all the formalizations
of large games that we have considered should be regarded as equivalent and the
choice of which one to use in practice regarded as a matter of taste and convenience.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we prove several results needed for our main results. Lemma 4
deals with measures with a finite support, which can be thought of as a vector in
some Euclidean space. Roughly, Lemma 4 says that the Prohorov distance between
two measures whose support is contained in some finite set is proportional to their
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Euclidean distance.
Lemma 4 Let τ, µ ∈M(X) be such that supp(τ)∪ supp(µ) ⊆ Ψ, where Ψ is a finite
set. If there exists ε > 0 such that |τl−µl| ≤ ε for all 1 ≤ l ≤ |Ψ|, then ρ(τ, µ) ≤ |Ψ|ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and B ⊆ X be Borel measurable. Then,
τ(B) =
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
τl ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
(µl + ε) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
µl + |Ψ|ε ≤ µ(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε. (19)
Similarly, we can show that µ(B) ≤ τ(B|Ψ|ε(B)) + |Ψ|ε. This implies that ρ(τ, µ) ≤
|Ψ|ε.
Lemma 5 shows that in large games, deviations by a small fraction of players have
a small impact on the distribution of actions.
Lemma 5 Let Gn be a game with a finite number of players and let f and g be
strategies. If |{t ∈ Tn : f(t) 6= g(t)}|/n ≤ γ, then ρ(νn ◦ f−1, νn ◦ g−1) ≤ γ.
Proof. Let µ = νn ◦ f−1 and τ = νn ◦ g−1. Let B ⊆ X be Borel measurable.
Then,
τ(B) =
|{t : g(t) ∈ B}|
n
≤ |{t : f(t) ∈ B}|
n
+
|{t : f(t) 6= g(t)}|
n
=µ(B) +
|{t : f(t) 6= g(t)}|
n
≤ µ(Bγ(B)) + γ.
(20)
Similarly, we can show that µ(B) ≤ τ(Bγ(B)) + γ. This implies that ρ(τ, µ) ≤ γ.
In particular, we have that ρ(νn ◦ f−1, νn ◦ (f \t x)−1) ≤ 1/n for all strategies f ,
players t ∈ Tn and actions x ∈ X.
Lemma 6 draws conclusions for games with a continuum of players from properties
of large finite games and was used in Lemma 1. It considers a more general case in
which a game Gn = ((Tn, Σn, νn), Vn, X) with finitely many players has |Tn| players
(not necessarily equal to n), and νn is the uniform measure on Tn.
Lemma 6 Let G = ((T, Σ, ϕ), V, X) be a game with a continuum of players, τ be
a distribution on C × X satisfying τC = λ ◦ V −1 ∈ T (C) and ε ≥ 0. Suppose that
{Gn}∞n=1 is a sequence of games with a finite number of players and {fn}∞n=1 is a
31
sequence of strategies such that |Tn| → ∞, fn is an (εn, ηn) – equilibrium of Gn for all
n, limn εn = ε, limn ηn = 0 and limn νn ◦ (Vn, fn)−1 = τ , then τ is an ε – equilibrium
distribution of G.
This lemma can be established using an argument analogous to the one employed
to prove that condition 3 implies 2 in Theorem 3. Both results rely on the following
lemma.
Lemma 7 Let Z be a metric space, {τk}∞k=1 be a sequence in T (Z) converging to
τ ∈ T (Z), and {Ak}∞k=1 be a sequence of Borel subsets of Z with limk τk(Ak) = 0.
Then, for all z ∈ supp(τ), there exists a subsequence {τkj}∞j=1 of {τk}∞k=1 and an
element zj ∈ supp(τkj) \ Akj for all j ∈ N such that limj zj = z.
Proof. Let z ∈ supp(τ) and suppose the assertion were false. Then there is an
open neighborhood U of z such that U ∩(supp(τk)\Ak) = ∅ for all sufficiently large k.
Thus, U∩supp(τk) ⊆ Ak for all sufficiently large k and hence limk τk(U∩supp(τk)) = 0.
Since τk(U) = τk(U ∩ supp(τk)) + τk(U \ supp(τk)) = τk(U ∩ supp(τk)), it follows that
0 ≤ τ(U) ≤ lim infk τk(U) = limk τk(U) = 0. Hence, τ(U) = 0, contradicting the
hypothesis that z ∈ supp(τ).
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